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Non-linear Relation between External Debt and Economic Growth in Nigeria: 
Does the Investment Channel Matter? 
      




Large external debt stock has been identified as one of the most important factors which have restricted the 
development of many poor countries. The consensus in the literature remains that external debt promotes growth to 
the extent that a country does not exceed its debt carrying capacity. Otherwise, additional debt accumulation would 
serve as a tax on future investment returns capable of creating disincentive to invest in the highly indebted countries. 
In the light of these arguments, this study investigated the possible role of domestic investment in the non-linear 
relation between external debt and economic growth in Nigeria over the period from 1981 to 2015. Based on the 
results of threshold regression analysis employed in this study, the overall findings showed that the impact of external 
debt on economic growth is sensitive to both measures of external debt used, and whether or not the role of domestic 
investment is accounted for. Specifically, this study confirmed the existence of the debt Laffer curve associated with 
the debt overhang theory arising from excessive external debt accumulation. Similarly, empirical support was 
obtained for the crowding-out effect of excessive external debt servicing. Also, accounting for the role of domestic 
investment in the non-linear relation between external debt and economic growth reduces the optimal debt carrying 
capacity of the country. It is therefore suggested that the Nigerian government internalizes a maximum ceiling of 
6.81% as the share of external debt stock in gross national income (GNI) so as to enjoy the resulting growth benefits. 
External debt financing sources that are free of interest charge could also be explored so as to circumvent the burden 
imposed by excessive external debt servicing.  
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1. Introduction 
Owing to the dearth of sufficient capital to finance developmental projects, developing countries have 
found an alternative in contracting external debt. High external debt profile of developing countries in 
recent times has plunged most of them into crisis, thereby leaving them with an option of seeking debt 
relief. This scenario has in turn sparked off wide-ranging debates among academia and policy makers alike 
concerning the growth potentials of external debt. The consensus in the literature remains that external debt 
promotes growth to the extent that a country does not exceed its debt carrying capacity, otherwise 
additional debt accumulation would serve as a tax on future investment returns capable of creating 
disincentive to invest in such highly indebted countries. As noted by Dǒgan and Bilgili (2014), high 
external debt contracted by developing countries in the second half of the 1990s has become one of the 
most important factors which have restricted the development of some of these poor countries. 
The Nigerian economy is not completely insulated from the issue of external debt sustainability. The 
country’s large external debt profile dates back to the heydays of oil price increases during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Statistics show that Nigeria’s external debt stock (as percentage of GDP) exhibited an 
upward trend between 1980 and 2008 with external debt-to-GDP ratio rising from 13.9% in 1980 to 64.6% 
in 1988. The high external debt in the 1990s led to government’s inability to fully service it thereby 
making unpaid debt service to build up as fresh debt. External debt-to-GDP ratio later stood at 65.02% 
between 2000 and 2003. In reaction to the upward and unsustainable nature of external debt, the Nigerian 
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government in 2005 concluded a debt relief agreement with Paris Club resulting in a debt cancellation to 
the tune of US$ 18 billion registered as Official Development Assistance (ODA) by creditor countries. 
Consequently, the debt relief agreement helped reduce the country’s debt stock from US$ 36 billion in 
2004 to US$ 4 billion in 2006, and since then Nigeria’s external debt-to-GDP ratio has remained at 
relatively low levels (Jarju et al., 2016).   
To this end, the present study revisits the external debt-growth nexus debate in the following distinct 
ways. The majority of the previous studies utilized a single measure of external debt, namely, external 
debt-to-GDP ratio while ignoring other debt indicators with exceptions in few cases, such as, Clements et 
al. (2003), Forgha et al. (2014), Jarju et al. (2016), and Mathew and Mordecai (2016), Onakoya and 
Ogunade (2017), Ademola et al. (2018). This study, therefore, innovates by following the works of 
Clements et al. (2003), most especially, to utilize all available measures of external debt to serve as 
robustness checks.  
From the literature, it is also observed that only few country-specific studies had explored the 
threshold regression modeling framework (see, for instance, Schclarek, 2005; Osinubi and Olaleru, 2006; 
Omotosho et al., 2016) to uncover the non-linear relation between external debt and economic growth. 
This approach has also been explored in other areas such as the study by Mehrara (2007) which unveiled 
the threshold beyond which inflation becomes harmful to economic growth with focus on Iran. The vast 
majority, however, explored other approaches ranging from autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL), 
ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS) to Markov-switching and error correction 
modeling techniques (see, for instance, Tuffour, 2012; Dǒgan and Bilgili, 2014; Forgha et al, 2014; 
Mathew and Mordecai, 2016; Saifuddin, 2016; Ebi and Imoke, 2017; Onakoya and Ogunade, 2017; 
Ademola et al., 2018, among others). The present study would employ the threshold regression modeling 
approach to complement evidence on non-linear external debt-growth relation in the Nigerian case, in 
addition to making use of alternative measures of external debt ignored by most of the past studies. 
Moreover, the available literature scarcely examines the effect of external debt on economic growth 
via the investment channel (see, for instance, Pattillo et al., 2004; Tuffour, 2012; Checherita and Rother, 
2010; Forgha et al, 2014; Ebi and Imoke, 2017). The present study contributes additionally to knowledge 
through its investigation of the possible role of investment in the non-linear relation between external debt 
and economic growth in Nigeria. This empirical exercise would also be subject to robustness checks via 
the use of different measures of external debt.  
The rest of the study proceeds as follows: Section two contains a review of both the theoretical and the 
empirical literature. Methodology and data are issues discussed in Section three. Section four discusses 
empirical results, and Section five concludes the paper. 
 
2. Review of the Literature 
2.1  The Theoretical Literature 
Several theories have emerged to explain the non-linear relationship between external debt (stock and 
service) and economic growth. However, two theories, namely the debt overhang theory and the crowding-
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out effect hypothesis, have rather been subjected to widespread empirical scrutiny. According to Krugman 
(1988), debt overhang is the presence of an existing, “inherited” debt sufficiently large that creditors do not 
expect with confidence to be fully repaid. Further, a country has a debt overhang problem when the 
expected present value of potential future resource transfers is less than its debt.  
The debt overhang theory states that when a debtor country is unable to meet its external debt 
obligations, debt repayments become linked to the country’s economic performance. The country benefits 
partially from an increase in output or exports because a fraction of the increase is used to service the debt 
and accrues to the creditors. The debt overhang acts like a high marginal tax rate on the country lowering 
the return to investment and providing disincentive to domestic capital formation. The theory in turn raises 
the possibility of a “Debt Laffer Curve, DLC” (Savvides, 1992).  
The DLC shows that along the left or “good side” of the curve, increases in the face value of debt 
service are associated with increases in debt repayment, while increases in the face value lower expected 
repayment on the right or “wrong” side of the curve. The peak of the curve is the point where large debt 
stocks begin acting as a steep marginal tax on investment. This also relates to the point at which debt 
begins to have a negative marginal impact on growth (Pattillo et al., 2002). In other words, high level of 
indebtedness discourages investment and negatively affects growth as future higher taxes are expected to 
repay the debt (Ali and Mustapha, 2012). 
Similarly, the crowding-out effect hypothesis holds that the accumulation of a large debt may stifle 
economic growth through lower investment. External debt would be beneficial to investment up to a 
certain threshold, beyond which excessive debts start to place constraints on investment (Banayed et al., 
2015). The crowding out of private investment occurs when government services debt on a recurring basis. 
High external debt has the effect of raising government’s interest bill and the budget deficit thereby 
reducing public savings, and this in turn raises interest rates or crowd-out credit available for private 
investment with the consequence of dampening economic growth (Clements et al., 2003).   
 
2.2  The Empirical Literature 
A number of studies have investigated the non-linear relation between external debt and growth, and 
therefore confirmed the validity of the debt overhang theory of external debt stock and crowding-out effect 
hypothesis of external debt servicing. For instance, Osinubi and Olaleru (2006) utilized the threshold 
regression and reported the existence of the debt Laffer curve or non-linear effects of external debt on 
growth in Nigeria. Similarly, Omotosho et al. (2016) revisited the nexus between public debt (including 
domestic and external debt) and Nigeria’s economic growth with the aid of threshold regression. Their 
results confirmed the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between public debt and economic 
growth in Nigeria. Tuffour (2012) examined the nexus between external debt and economic growth in 
Ghana using OLS, and the author established the presence of a U-shaped debt Laffer curve for the 
Ghanaian economy.     
Moreover, Dǒgan and Bilgili (2014) employed the Markov-switching model to investigate the impact 
of private and public external debt on Turkish growth. The authors reported a negative impact of external 
debt on growth, with public external debt having an overwhelming impact. Also, Jarju et al. (2016) 
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explored the relation between external debt and growth in West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
countries using panel data estimators. The authors offered evidence in favour of the debt overhang theory 
arising from the negative effect of excessive external debt stock on growth. They also confirmed the 
crowding out effect arising from the dampening growth effect of excessive external debt servicing. 
Similarly, Takanlou (2014) revealed that budget deficit financing (through issuance of debt instruments, 
for instance) crowded out private investment in Algeria while crowding in private investment in Iran.     
Checherita and Rother (2010) identified the channels through which government debt influences 
economic growth in Euro Area as including private saving, public saving, public investment, total factor 
productivity (TFP), and sovereign long-term nominal and real interest rates. In the same vein, Clements et 
al. (2003) found evidence in support of the debt overhang theory in a panel of 55 low-income countries. 
Pattillo et al. (2002, 2004) established a non-linear relationship between external debt and economic 
growth in a panel of 93 countries. The authors also found the existence of an investment channel through 
which external debt impacts growth. In addition, the threshold regression analysis of Mupunga and Roux 
(2015) confirmed the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship (or the debt Laffer curve) between 
public debt and economic growth in Zimbabwe.  
On a final note, this study offers few innovations. First, the study investigates the possible role of 
investment in the non-linear relation between external debt and economic growth in Nigeria. Second, the 
present study utilizes the threshold regression analysis seldom used in the literature. Lastly, this study 
employs alternative measures of external debt for robustness checks. 
    
3. Methodology and Data Issues 
3.1 Model Specification 
To investigate the presence of nonlinearities in the relationship between external debt and growth, this 
study adapts the panel threshold regression approach proposed by Hansen (1999) to time-series analysis of 
the Nigerian economy. Assume initially that the external debt-growth relation is specified in a linear 
regression model as below.                                (1) 
Where       is the natural log of real GDP (a proxy for economic growth),      is external debt 
indicators (debt stock and debt services both expressed as percentages of gross national income and 
exports),    is a vector of control variables including gross capital formation and trade openness,   ,   ,   
are regression parameters, and   is the stochastic error term while subscript   is the time dimension. 
Following the threshold framework developed by Hansen (1999), eq. (1) becomes                 (       )       (       )           (2) 
Where      is the threshold variable and it is used to test for the presence of threshold effect of external 
debt on growth,   denotes a threshold parameter.  ( ) is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if 
external debt (    ) is below a determined threshold value ( ) and 0 otherwise.  
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Eq. (2) can conveniently be divided into two regimes depending on whether the threshold variable is 
above or below the estimated threshold. The two regimes are distinguished by different regression slopes    and    in two equations as follows. 
                        if              (3)                        if              (4) 
where eq. (3) represents the regime below the threshold, while eq. (4) describes the regime above the 
threshold. The vector of control variables ( ) is regime invariant. 
Additionally, there is need to identify the debt threshold and test for its presence. In order to identify 
the threshold, the first step eq. (2) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Then, the sum of squared 
errors (  ) is computed for all possible values of the threshold variable (external debt indicators in the 
present case), where     ̂( )  ̂( ). In the second step, the threshold parameter is obtained by 
minimizing   , such that  ̂            ( ). Similarly, once the endogenous threshold is estimated, it is 
essential to test whether the threshold effect is statistically significant. The null hypothesis is that there is 
no threshold effect, that is,                     (5) 
The null hypothesis implies that the slope coefficients are equivalent in the two regimes. Therefore, 
under the   , the threshold model (eq.(2)) is equivalent to the linear model (eq.(1)). The likelihood ratio 
test of the null hypothesis is based on the F-statistic:     (     ( ̂))   ̂⁄           (6) 
Where    and    are the sum of squared errors under the null and alternative hypotheses, while   ̂ is the 
estimate of the regression error variance (  ). Given that the threshold value is not identified under the null 
hypothesis, the asymptotic distribution of    is not standard. As a solution, Hansen (1999) proposed a 
bootstrap method to simulate the probability value for the F-statistic (  ). 
In order to test for the role of domestic investment in the non-linear relation between external debt and 
growth, the study leans on the approach of Tuffour (2012) by estimating two strands of growth models, 
with one omitting the investment variable while the other accounts for domestic investment. The idea is to 
examine if the inclusion of the investment variable alters the magnitude of the debt threshold or not. For 
threshold effect to exist, it is expected that from eq. (2),      and     .     
 
3.2  Data Scope and Sources 
The data on relevant variables employed in this study, such as, real GDP (a proxy for economic 
growth), various measures of external debt (namely, external debt stock-to-GNI ratio, external debt-to-
exports ratio, external debt servicing-to-GNI ratio, and external debt servicing-to-exports ratio), and other 
growth determinants including gross capital formation (a proxy for domestic investment)  and trade 
openness (a proxy for macroeconomic environment) were collected from the World Bank’s World 




4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Here, the results of preliminary analysis including descriptive statistics and unit root test are presented. 
This section also discusses the Threshold regression results.   
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics on the main variables used in the study over the period of 1981 
to 2015. The average value of real GDP (log-levels) is approximately 25.95. Other variables including 
external debt stock (% of GNI), external debt stock (% of exports), external debt service (% of GNI), 
external debt service (% of exports), gross capital formation (% of GDP), and trade openness have their 
respective means as 70.26%, 159.69%, 5.64%, 13.05%, 12.59%, and 51.12%. The greater shares of 
external debt stock in GNI and exports reflect the high external debt profile of the Nigerian economy even 
until date. This has the implication that additional external debt serves as increasing tax on the country’s 
national income and export proceeds as the government makes debt repayment. In terms of volatility as 
measured by the coefficient of variation of each variable, the external debt indicators are highly volatile 
while the remaining variables are relatively less volatile. In terms of the shape of the probability density of 
each variable as accounted for by Jarque-Bera statistic, all variables except gross capital formation follow 
normal distribution (p > 0.1). Despite that the majority of the variables are well-behaved statistically, it is 
important to check the stationarity status of the variables, the issue which is addressed in the next section. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Standard deviation Coefficient of variation (%) Jarque-Bera stat       35 25.946 0.492 1.896 4.370[0.112]      35 70.255 59.828 85.158 3.151[0.207]      35 159.69 123.87 77.569 2.441[0.295]      35 5.644 4.595 81.414 2.439[ 0.295]      35 13.047 10.322 79.114 3.044[0.218]     35 12.588 6.122 48.633 40.859[0.000]     35 51.116 16.603 32.481 1.551[0.461] 
Source: Authors’ computation. 
  
4.2 The ADF Unit Root Test Result 
The result of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test is shown in Table 2. Here, only test 
regressions that are close to rejecting the null hypothesis of nonstationarity are reported. Accordingly, it 
can be observed that the natural log of real GDP, external debt stock (% of GNI), external debt stock (% of 
exports), and trade openness become stationary after first differencing; hence, they are said to be integrated 
of order one, that is, I(1). Other variables including external debt service (% of GNI), external debt service 
(% of exports), and gross capital formation are stationary at levels; hence, they are said to be integrated of 
order zero, that is, I(0).   
Table 2: Results of ADF Unit root Test 
Variable Level First  Difference I(d)       -2.068a -4.912a*** I(1)      -2.561a -5.624a*** I(1)      -3.120a -4.639a*** I(1)      -4.008a** ………………….† I(0)      -5.072a*** …………………. I(0)     -4.447b*** …………………. I(0)     -1.916b -7.999b*** I(1) 
Note: ***, ** indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis of a 
unit root at 5% and 10%, respectively; I(d) is the order of 
integration and it refers to the number of differencing required for 
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a series to become stationary; †implies that a series that is 
stationary at levels does not require its first difference being 
reported; a and b denote model with intercept and trend, and 
model with intercept only, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
 
4.3 The Threshold Regression Results 
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of estimated threshold regression using external debt stock indicators 
without and with the investment variable. Also, Tables 5 and 6 present the results of estimated threshold 
regression using external debt service indicators without and with the investment variable. In line with 
Jarju et al. (2016), the first panel of models is a test for the validity of the debt overhang theory of external 
debt stock (see Tables 3 and 4) while the second strand of models verifies the predictions of the crowding-
effect hypothesis of external debt servicing (see Tables 5 and 6). Both strands of models are interpreted in 
turn. 
4.3.1 Threshold analysis of external debt stock-growth nexus 
From Table 3, external debt stock, % of GNI is used as the debt indicator, whereas the study employs 
external debt stock, % of exports as the debt indicator in Table 4. In both tables, Panel A is a model 
without the investment variable, while Panel B is a model that accounts for investment. In Panel A, there is 
an estimated threshold range of 26.05% to 64.16%, which in turn breaks up the sample size into two 
regimes: regime 1 and regime 2, respectively. It can be observed that within this threshold range, an 
increase in external debt by 1 percentage point reduces real GDP on average by 6.7% (in regime 1) and 
1.2% (regime 2) keeping other variables constant. Irrespective of regimes, trade openness has a positive 
effect on real GDP, though the impact coefficients are not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
However, by accounting for the influence of domestic investment in Panel B, the minimum threshold 
gets reduced to 6.81%. When the external debt is less than this threshold, an increase in external debt stock 
by 1 percentage point leads to a decline in real GDP by 9.9% on average (in regime 1). However, when 
external debt is greater than or equal to this threshold but is less than the maximum threshold (64.161%), a 
reduction in real GDP to the tune of 0.9% is induced for every 1 percentage point in external debt stock, % 
of GNI (in regime 2). This result confirms the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
external debt stock and real GDP in Nigeria. 
Similarly, irrespective of regimes, domestic investment dampens growth as every 1 percentage point 
increase in gross capital formation reduces real GDP on average by 3% in both regimes. The impact 
coefficient (-0.03) is also statistically significant at 1% level of significance. However, trade openness 
raises real GDP by the same magnitude (3%) only that the impact coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. The incorporation of the role of investment improves the explanatory power of the external 
debt-growth threshold model as reflected in the rise of the adjusted coefficient of determination from 89% 
(in Panel A) to 96% (in Panel B). In both panels, the large values of the F-statistics testify to the overall 
significance and adequacy of the estimated threshold models at 1% level of significance.    
Moreover, from Table 4 where external debt stock (% of exports) is used as the debt indicator, trade 
openness and gross capital formation cease to be significant determinants of output growth in both Panels A 
and B. As against what obtains in Table 3, only one threshold is identified and that is 58.78%. Below the 
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threshold, a 1 percentage point increase in external debt, % of exports is capable of raising real GDP on 
average by 0.1% (in regime 1), but beyond this threshold, the same magnitude generates a reduction in real 
GDP by an average of  0.1% (in regime 2). However, the impact of external debt stock, % of exports is only 
significant in regime 2 at 1% level of significance. This same result holds even when the effect of domestic 
investment is accounted for in Panel B. By implication, Nigeria would be on the right side (declining 
portion) of the debt Laffer curve if and only if external debt stock, % of exports exceeds the estimated 
threshold of 58.78%. Additionally, accounting for the role of investment improves the explanatory power of 
the external debt-growth threshold model as reflected in the rise of the adjusted coefficient of determination 
from 86% (in Panel A) to 87% (in Panel B). In both panels, the large values of the F-statistics testify to the 
overall significance and adequacy of the estimated threshold models at 1% level of significance. It can be 
convincingly argued that irrespective of the measures of external debt stock used, this study offers evidence 
in favour of validity of the debt overhang theory which stipulates a non-linear relationship between external 
debt and economic growth2. 
Table 3: Threshold regression of the nexus between external debt stock indicator and growth 
Indicator 1: External debt stock (% of GNI) 
Dependent variable:       
 Panel A Panel B 
Model without investment Model with Investment 
Regime 1: 
(        ) Regime 2: (           ) Regime 1: (        ) Regime 2: (           ) 
      -0.067***(0.008) -0.012***(0.002) 0.099***(0.019) -0.009***(0.002)        -0.03***(0.003) -0.03***(0.003)      0.003(0.002) 0.003(0.002) 0.003**(0.001) 0.003**(0.001)   26.874***(0.137) 26.414***(0.002) 26.665***(0.163) 26.638***(0.117) 
Identification of Thresholds ( )    26.046 6.806    64.161 64.161 
Other diagnostics 
Adj.    0.890 0.955 
F-stat 46.857[0.000] 103.291[0.000] 
Note: ***, ** indicate the statistical significance of coefficients at 1% and 5%, respectively; the values in parentheses and block brackets 
are, respectively, the standard errors and the probabilities.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
 
Table 4: Threshold regression of the nexus between external debt stock indicator and growth 
Indicator 2: External debt stock (% of exports) 
Dependent variable:       
 Panel A Panel B 
Model without investment Model with Investment 
Regime 1: 
(        ) Regime 2: (        ) Regime 1: (        ) Regime 2: (        ) 
      0.004(0.004) -0.001**(0.0004) 0.003(0.007) -0.001**(0.0005)        -0.009(0.007) -0.009(0.007)      0.002(0.002) 0.002(0.002) -0.00004(0.003) -0.00004(0.003)   26.420***(0.179) 25.753***(0.150) 26.649***(0.304) 26.007***(0.343) 
Identification of Threshold ( )    58.779 58.779 
Other diagnostics 
Adj.    0.861 0.865 
F-stat 53.481[0.000] 44.586[0.000] 
Note: ***, ** indicate the statistical significance of coefficients at 1% and 5%, respectively; the values in parentheses and block brackets 
are, respectively, the standard errors and the probabilities.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
                                                          
2This result complements the previous findings on the existence of debt Laffer curve in the Nigerian economy (see, for instance, 
Osinubi and Olaleru, 2006 and Omotosho et al., 2016).  
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4.3.2 Threshold analysis of external debt service-growth nexus 
From Table 5, external debt service, % of GNI is used as the debt indicator, whereas the study 
employs external debt service, % of exports as the debt indicator in Table 6. In both tables, Panel C is a 
model without the investment variable, while Panel D is a model that accounts for investment. In both 
panels, the estimated threshold is 2.786, which in turn breaks up the sample size into two regimes: regime 
1 and regime 2. From Table 5, it can be observed that below this threshold, an increase in external debt 
service by 1 percentage point reduces real GDP on average by 28% (in regime 1) and 1.6% (in regime 2) 
keeping other variables constant. The effect of external debt service is magnified by accounting for the role 
of domestic investment in panel D as a 1 percentage point increases further decreases real GDP by the 
magnitude of 0.9 percentage point (in regime 1) and 0.8 percentage point (in regime 2). The impact 
coefficients on external debt service, % of GNI are statistically significant at 1 to 5%. In both panels, trade 
openness has no significant impact on output growth. 
Similarly, irrespective of regimes, domestic investment dampens growth as every 1 percentage point 
increase in gross capital formation reduces real GDP on average by 1.4% in both regimes. The impact 
coefficient (-0.014) is also statistically significant at 5% level of significance. The incorporation of the role 
of investment improves the explanatory power of the external debt-growth threshold model as reflected in 
the rise of the adjusted coefficient of determination from 81% (in Panel C) to 83% (in Panel D). In both 
panels, the large values of the F-statistics testify to the overall significance and adequacy of the estimated 
threshold models at 1% level of significance.    
Moreover, from Table 6 where external debt service (% of exports) is used as the debt indicator, trade 
openness appears to be an insignificant determinant of output growth in Panels C and D. However, in both 
panels, domestic investment has a negative and significant effect on output growth. Based on this measure 
of external debt service (that is, as % of exports), a higher threshold is estimated at 5.93%. Below the 
threshold, a 1 percentage point increase in external debt service, % of exports is capable of reducing real 
GDP on average by 0.9% (in regime 1), but beyond this threshold, the same magnitude generates a 
reduction in real GDP by an average of  1.7% (in regime 2). However, the impact of external debt service, 
% of exports is only significant in regime 2 at 1% level of significance. This same result holds even when 
the effect of domestic investment is accounted for in Panel D except that the effect of external debt service 
gets magnified in both regimes.  
Irrespective of the measures of external debt service (see Table 5 and Table 6), the negative impact of 
external debt service obtained under the two regimes indicates that excessive external debt servicing is 
capable of inducing investment cuts with negative spill-over effects on output growth. This result therefore 
lends empirical support to the crowding-out effect of excessive debt servicing in the Nigerian economy3. In 
addition, accounting for the role of investment improves the explanatory power of the external debt-growth 
threshold model as reflected in the rise of the adjusted coefficient of determination from 81% (in Panel C) 
to 83% (in Panel D). In both panels, the large values of the F-statistics testify to the overall significance 
and adequacy of the estimated threshold models at 1% level of significance. 
                                                          
3This result parallels the findings of Jarju et al. (2016).   
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Table 5: Threshold regression of the nexus between external debt service indicator and growth 
Indicator 1: External debt service (% of GNI) 
Dependent variable:       
 Panel C Panel D 
Model without investment Model with Investment 
Regime 1: 
(        ) Regime 2: (        ) Regime 1: (        ) Regime 2: (        ) 
      -0.280**(0.082) -0.016(0.013) -0.289***(0.032) -0.024**(0.011)        -0.014**(0.006) -0.014**(0.006)      0.002(0.003) 0.002(0.003) -0.001(0.003) -0.001(0.003)   26.704***(0.139) 25.704***(0.205) 27.033***(0.189) 26.098***(0.285) 
Identification of Threshold ( )    2.786 2.786 
Other diagnostics 
Adj.    0.807 0.826 
F-stat 36.573[0.000] 33.268[0.000] 
Note: ***, ** indicate the statistical significance of coefficients at 1% and 5%, respectively; the values in parentheses and block brackets 
are, respectively, the standard errors and the probabilities.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
 
Table 6: Threshold regression of the nexus between external debt service indicator and growth 
Indicator 2: External debt service (% of exports) 
Dependent variable:       
 Panel C Panel D 
Model without investment Model with Investment 
Regime 1: 
(        ) Regime 2: (        ) Regime 1: (        ) Regime 2: (        ) 
      -0.009(0.052) -0.017***(0.006) -0.023(0.058) -0.02***(0.006)        -0.012*(0.006) -0.012*(0.006)      -0.002(0.003) -0.002(0.003) -0.005(0.004) -0.005(0.004)   26.72***(0.176) 26.057***(0.269) 27.049***(0.269) 26.425***(0.382) 
Identification of Threshold ( )    5.926 5.926 
Other diagnostics 
Adj.    0.813 0.825 
F-stat 37.956[0.000] 33.106[0.000] 
Note: ***, **, * indicate the statistical significance of coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%,  respectively; the values in parentheses and block 
brackets are, respectively, the standard errors and the probabilities.  
Source: Authors’ computation. 
 
5. Concluding Remark 
The present study revisited the external-growth nexus debate while accounting for the role of domestic 
investment in the Nigerian economy between 1981 and 2015. In other words, this study tested empirically 
the validity of the debt overhang theory and crowding out effect hypothesis by exploring alternative 
indicators of external debt. In order to achieve this empirical exercise, the threshold regression approach of 
Hansen (1999) was employed. The overall findings showed that the impact of external debt on output 
growth is sensitive to the measures of external debt used and whether or not the role of domestic 
investment is accounted for in the threshold regression analysis. Specifically, this study confirmed the 
existence of the debt Laffer curve associated with the debt overhang theory arising from the excessive 
external debt stock. Similarly, empirical support was obtained for the crowding-out effect of excessive 
external debt servicing. Also, accounting for the role of domestic investment in the non-linear relation 
between external debt and economic growth reduces the optimal debt carrying capacity of the country. By 
implication, high rate of domestic investment was associated with low external debt stock regime. 
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Based on these findings, the study suggests that the Nigerian government places a ceiling of 6.81% as 
this is the optimal threshold that would ensure external debt stock impacts the economy positively given 
the important role of domestic investment. Similarly, irrespective of thresholds chosen for external debt 
servicing, a negative output growth would always result. To this end, it is suggested that the Nigerian 
government should do away with sentiments and therefore explore the sources of external debt financing 
that are non-interest based. This has the effect of reducing the burden imposed by external debt service 
payments, capable of building up into fresh debts if not paid as at when due. Lastly, the negative growth 
impact of domestic investment remains a challenge for the Nigerian government to make efficient use of 
external debt for infrastructural development that could in turn encourage private investment and boost 
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Appendix: Data Summary 
Year 
Real GDP  
(N’ billion) 
External debt service 
(% of exports) 
External debt service  
(% of GNI) 
External debt stock 
(% of exports) 
External debt service 
(% of GNI) 
Gross capital formation 
(% of GDP) 
Trade openness 
(%) 
1981 124.90 9.20 3.01 58.78 19.23 34.02 48.29 
1982 123.58 16.23 4.15 93.09 23.83 29.74 37.75 
1983 117.34 23.61 7.38 161.77 50.54 21.87 27.04 
1984 114.97 32.94 14.68 144.03 64.16 12.42 23.61 
1985 124.54 32.78 15.90 138.08 66.98 11.36 25.90 
1986 113.63 38.04 10.63 412.07 115.12 15.70 23.72 
1987 101.42 14.13 5.10 370.69 133.77 12.66 41.65 
1988 109.07 30.37 9.71 406.95 130.15 9.85 35.31 
1989 116.12 24.69 9.56 351.26 136.02 11.75 60.39 
1990 130.94 22.60 11.97 226.66 120.05 14.43 53.03 
1991 130.13 22.06 11.81 251.12 134.45 13.79 64.88 
1992 130.70 18.57 9.16 223.23 110.12 12.80 61.03 
1993 133.43 13.40 11.09 275.82 228.37 13.61 58.11 
1994 134.64 18.95 11.90 334.99 210.33 11.20 42.31 
1995 134.23 14.73 6.96 274.01 129.51 7.08 59.77 
1996 140.93 13.14 6.80 185.18 95.90 7.30 57.69 
1997 144.88 8.71 4.22 175.16 84.76 8.37 76.86 
1998 148.82 13.07 4.57 297.55 103.89 8.62 66.17 
1999 149.52 7.61 3.12 206.42 84.59 7.01 55.85 
2000 157.47 8.76 4.61 152.83 80.46 7.03 71.38 
2001 164.42 12.72 6.30 158.33 78.46 7.59 81.81 
2002 170.64 8.06 2.79 173.46 59.94 7.02 63.38 
2003 188.31 5.93 2.72 133.35 61.19 9.91 75.22 
2004 251.84 4.47 2.19 104.28 51.16 7.40 48.45 
2005 260.52 15.41 8.91 45.07 26.05 5.47 50.75 
2006 281.91 10.98 4.77 15.74 6.83 8.27 64.61 
2007 301.16 1.44 0.65 17.33 7.86 9.26 64.46 
2008 320.04 0.76 0.36 14.53 6.81 8.33 64.97 
2009 342.23 1.28 0.49 26.87 10.29 12.09 61.80 
2010 369.06 1.50 0.36 18.50 4.43 17.29 42.65 
2011 387.10 0.51 0.13 17.09 4.54 16.21 52.79 
2012 403.67 1.34 0.30 18.22 4.13 14.91 44.38 
2013 425.44 0.49 0.10 21.08 4.32 14.90 31.05 
2014 452.28 5.32 0.83 28.95 4.51 15.80 30.89 
2015 464.28 2.87 0.31 56.72 6.15 15.49 21.12 
Source: Authors’ compilation from World Development Indicators (WDI, 2017). 
